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In our daily life, it is very common to make decisions in uncertain situations. The Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT) has been widely used in laboratory studies because of its good
simulation of uncertainty in real life activities. The present study aimed to examine the
neural correlates of uncertain decision making with the IGT. Twenty-six university students
completed this study. An adapted IGT was administered to them, and the EEG data
were recorded. The adapted IGT we used allowed us to analyze the choice evaluation,
response selection, and feedback evaluation stages of uncertain decision making within
the same paradigm. In the choice evaluation stage, the advantageous decks evoked
larger P3 amplitude in the left hemisphere, while the disadvantageous decks evoked
larger P3 in the right hemisphere. In the response selection stage, the response of
“pass” (the card was not turned over; the participants neither won nor lost money)
evoked larger negativity preceding the response compared to that of “play” (the card was
turned over; the participant either won or lost money). In the feedback evaluation stage,
feedback-related negativity (FRN) was only sensitive to the valence (win/loss) but not the
magnitude (large/small) of the outcome, and P3 was sensitive to both the valence and the
magnitude of the outcome. These results were consistent with the notion that a positive
somatic state was represented in the left hemisphere and a negative somatic state was
represented in the right hemisphere. There were also anticipatory ERP effects that guided
the participants’ responses and provided evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis with
more precise timing.
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INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty can be defined as an imperfect knowledge about
the outcome that will follow a choice (Platt and Huettel, 2008).
Uncertainty exists in some form in all daily life choices, i.e., we
are always engaging in uncertain decision making. For example,
if you decide to step into an unfamiliar restaurant for dinner,
you may receive delicious food and feel happiness, or you may
be disappointed and feel regret.
In the laboratory, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Bechara
et al., 1994) simulates the uncertainty of decision making of
gains and losses in real life and provides a useful tool to exam-
ine uncertain decision making (Toplak et al., 2010). In the IGT, a
participant is presented with four decks of cards, and each card
contains a reward and a punishment. The participant is asked
to pick cards from these decks to earn as much money as pos-
sible. Decks A and B contain a large win each time and sometimes
an even larger loss; in the long term, the participant would lose
money if these decks continued to be selected (the disadvan-
tageous decks). Decks C and D contain a small win each time
and sometimes a small loss; in the long term, the participant
would earn money if these decks continued to be selected (the
advantageous decks)1.
Healthy participants will learn which decks are advantageous
and will select more often from these decks, while patients with
ventromedial prefrontal (VMPFC) lesions will persist in selecting
from the disadvantageous decks that provide a large immediate
reward (Bechara et al., 1996, 1997). More interestingly, healthy
comparisons showed anticipatory skin conductance responses
(SCRs) when they choose decks, and the SCRs were higher when
choosing disadvantageous decks; however, the VMPFC patients
did not show the same anticipatory SCRs (Bechara et al., 1996,
1997). After ∼80 trials, most healthy participants knew which
decks were good and which decks were bad. Some patients also
reached this explicit knowledge about the task, but they still
1It should be noted that some researchers thought the IGT should be an
ambiguous decision-making task because the participants know the probabil-
ities and magnitudes of the outcomes in a typical uncertain decision making
task, whereas in the IGT task, the participants do not know any of these
factors.
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tended to choose the disadvantageous decks without showing
anticipatory SCRs (Bechara et al., 1997). These results indicated
that although VMPFC patients understood the task and had some
explicit knowledge about the decks, they could not generate an
automatic emotional response to guide them to a better decision
(Bechara et al., 1997).
Based on their studies in VMPFC patients (e.g., Damasio
et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994) proposed the famous somatic marker
hypothesis; he argued that these patients had decision-making
deficits because they were not able to use somatic markers to
guide their decision making. The somatic markers are body-
generated, emotion-based signals (see also Dunn et al., 2006).
According to the hypothesis, specific internal and external stimuli
will cause changes in the body and brain (peripheral and cen-
tral representations); these changes converge to and compose the
emotion. The somatic signals projected to the brain represent the
basic element that will be perceived as a feeling. These emotions
and feelings are associated by learning and can be used to predict
future outcomes in specific situations. The SCR studies (Bechara
et al., 1996, 1997) on the IGT provided key evidence for the
somatic marker hypothesis (Dunn et al., 2006). Given that SCRs
represent physiological indicators of changes of somatic states, the
fact that the patients did not show anticipatory SCRs suggests that
when facing an imagined scenario or situation, the patients could
not change their somatic states. Thus, the fact that they could not
enact a somatic state proper to the outcome of a response is the
reason that they did not choose advantageously, i.e., myopia for
the future (Bechara et al., 2000).
However, there are several limitations of the SCR studies.
First, in the psychophysiology analysis, the deck that participants
selected at last was used to designate each anticipatory “somatic
marker,” however, in the deck selection phase, participants were
free to shift their attention across all decks prior to selecting
one. This procedure meant that the anticipatory SCRs may not
reflect attention to a single card but shifting attention across all
decks before making a choice (Dunn et al., 2006). Second, a study
using the IGT in rhesus monkeys showed that SCRs were associ-
ated with the anticipation of a reward after a decision had been
made rather than reflecting the decision-making process directly
(Amiez et al., 2003). Thus, due to the low temporal resolution
of SCRs, it was difficult to separate the signal related to response
selection from the anticipation of feedback after the response
(Dunn et al., 2006). One solution is to use other psychophysio-
logical responses with a faster time course, such as event-related
potentials (ERPs).
Many ERP studies have been performed on decision mak-
ing (Bland and Schaefer, 2011). Decision making can be divided
into three stages from an information-processing perspective: I,
choice evaluation; II, response selection; III, feedback processing
(Fang et al., 2009). However, most ERP studies on the IGT have
focused on the third stage, i.e., the modulations related to feed-
back. There were mainly two modulations related to feedback:
feedback-related negativity (FRN) and P3.
Gehring and Willoughby (2002) found that negativity was
present ∼265ms following the feedback of a win or a loss and
that the source was located in the medial frontal cortex. They
named this phenomenon MFN (medial frontal negativity), and
later studies called it FRN. The FRN was sensitive to loss; the
magnitude was larger for a loss than a win. Subsequent studies
revealed that FRN and P3 were differentially modulated by the
valence and the magnitude of the outcome. FRN was sensitive
to the valence but not the magnitude of the feedback, i.e., a loss
would cause a larger amplitude than a win, but the magnitude
of a loss or win did not have an effect on the amplitude of the
FRN (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004;
Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; Holroyd et al., 2006; Wu and
Zhou, 2009). These results indicated that FRN reflected the early
appraisal of feedback on a binary classification basis of good vs.
bad outcomes. Studies found that P3, which showed the largest
amplitude at central and parietal regions, was sensitive to both
magnitude and valence (Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; Hajcak
et al., 2006; Hewig et al., 2007). P3 may reflect a later, top-down
controlled feedback evaluation process, in which factors related to
the allocation of attentional resources played a role.
Only two ERP studies have examined the response selec-
tion stage (ERP modulations before the response was made) of
decision making using the IGT. Carlson and Zayas (2009) con-
ducted an ERP study using a children’s version of the IGT, the
Hungry Donkey Task (HDT), in 8-year-old children. In this study,
participants were asked to select one out of four doors for a hun-
gry donkey; behind each door, there were wins and losses of
apples. The participants were asked to earn as many apples as
possible for the donkey. The results showed anticipation effects
preceding door choice, i.e., ERP waveforms 300–150ms prior
to response selection were more negative for disadvantageous
door selections. These results indicated that children showed an
anticipation effect for the doors that were associated with losses
and were disadvantageous. Another study used the IGT in adults
and named the negativity preceding movement (response) the
Decision Preceding Negativity (DPN) (Bianchin and Angrilli,
2011). The authors found that the DPN was more negative over
the right frontal regions when participants selected the disad-
vantageous decks than the advantageous decks. These results
suggested a role for emotion anticipation in making decisions.
One limitation of these two ERP studies is that the response
selection stage may have been confounded with choice evaluation
because in their version (free choice version) of the IGT, partici-
pants were presented with four decks of cards and asked to select
one card at a time. Thus, the choice evaluation and the response
stage cannot be separated. To overcome this shortcoming, we
adopted a modified version of the IGT [single choice version,
adapted from Cauffman et al. (2010)] in the present study; par-
ticipants were presented with one card from a deck at a time
and asked to decide whether to play or pass that card. After a
response was made, the outcome of the current trial would be
presented. Using this paradigm, we could evaluate all three stages
(choice evaluation, response selection, and feedback evaluation)
of uncertain decision making.
For the present study, we had the c, based on Bechara et al.’s
(1996) assumption, in normal individuals, the brain contains
neural circuitry that links the stimulus configuration of a given
deck to the representations of goodness and badness. On the
other hand, the right frontal hemisphere is sensitive to punish-
ment learning and negative situations, whereas the left frontal
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hemisphere is sensitive to reward learning and positive situations
(Cunningham et al., 2005; Dunn et al., 2006; Ohgami et al., 2006).
Positive and negative somatic states are represented in the frontal
areas of the left and right hemisphere, respectively (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005; Dunn et al., 2006). Thus, we predicted that in
the choice evaluation stage, the advantageous decks would evoke
more activity in the left frontal hemisphere, and the disadvan-
tageous decks would evoke more activity in the right frontal
hemisphere, given that the decks are associated with positive and
negative somatic (emotional) representations.
Second, regarding the anticipation effect in the response selec-
tion stage of decision making, two studies (Carlson and Zayas,
2009; Bianchin and Angrilli, 2011) found that the amplitudes of
the readiness potential or the DPN over the right frontal regions
evoked by the disadvantageous decks were larger than those of the
advantageous decks, indicating that risky decisions would evoke a
stronger anticipation effect. We adopted a single choice version of
the IGT and asked the participants to decide to “play” or “pass”
a card from a deck. We predicted that, consistent with the previ-
ous studies, anticipation would also be associated with responses;
specifically, the response of “pass” would evoke larger right frontal
DPN than “play” because of the stronger somatic states. If the
participants perceived the trial to be risky and accompanied by a
greater physiological arousal, they would tend to “pass”; if the par-
ticipants perceived the trial to be safe, they would tend to “play.”
Thus, the response “pass” would show larger DPN than “play.”
Furthermore, for disadvantageous decks, if the participants per-
ceived the trial to be safe and a smaller physiological response
occurred, they would choose to “play” (there weremany win trials
in disadvantageous decks) and show a small DPN.
Third, for the feedback evaluation stage, we predicted that the
results would be consistent with previous studies in that the FRN
would only be sensitive to the valence of the outcome, whereas
the P3 would be sensitive to both the valence and the magnitude
of the outcome.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-eight university students participated in this study; two
participants were excluded from the analysis because of data
recording problems. The remaining 26 participants consisted of
12 females and 14 males. Their age ranged from 19 to 25 years
with a mean age of 22.35 years (SD = 1.74). None of the partic-
ipants had a history of mental illness, neurological illness, brain
injury, or drug/alcohol dependence. All participants had normal
or corrected to normal vision. Two participants were left handed,
whereas the rest were right handed measured by a handedness
questionnaire (Annett, 1970). An initial analysis showed that
handedness did not affect the results; thus, handedness was not
considered in further analysis. The present study was approved
by the ethical committee of the School of Psychology, Beijing
Normal University. Participants provided written informed con-
sent before the study.
EXPERIMENTAL TASK
The modified IGT used in this study was adapted from Cauffman
et al. (2010). In this task, the participants need tomake a play/pass
decision on one of the four decks preselected by the computer on
each trial.
To reduce eye movement during the experiment, the four
decks were presented on the screen in two rows. The decks were
labeled A, B, C, and D, but these labels were only for participants
to discriminate the cards and were unrelated to advantageous or
disadvantageous decks. The advantageous and disadvantageous
decks were randomly assigned to these labels. When we refer to
deck A, B, C, or D later in this paper, we mean that decks A
and B were disadvantageous decks and that decks C and D were
advantageous decks, as in the original version of the IGT.
The experimental flow is presented in Figure 1. Each trial
included three processing stages. In the stimulus presentation
(choice evaluation) stage, a fixation in the middle of the four
decks was presented for 1000ms. One of the four decks was high-
lighted with a yellow border, which meant that one card was
selected from that deck. Participants were required to decide to
play or pass that card, however, they could not make responses
during this period. In the response selection (decision execution)
stage, the fixation disappeared, and participants were required
to make a response. The participants could press the “←” key
if they wanted to play or the “→” key if they wanted to pass.
Feedback (feedback evaluation stage) for the current trial was pre-
sented 800ms after the response. The feedback was presented on
the screen for 1000ms, followed by a fixation presented for 1000–
1200ms, and then the next trial appeared. The participants began
with a loan of 2000 Yuan. The running total of the participant’s
“earnings” was presented at the end of each block (20 trials). Each
of the four decks was randomly preselected five times for partici-
pants to make a decision in each block. To reduce eye movement
and head movement, the feedback was presented near the center
of the screen (see Figure 1). We used the same outcome feedback
format as Cauffman et al. (2010), i.e., participants received the net
gain or loss of a card, rather than presenting both a gain and a loss.
If the outcome was “win,” the feedback was presented with a green
positive value (e.g., +50); if the outcome was “loss,” the feedback
was presented with a red negative value (e.g.,−100). If the partici-
pant chose to pass, “pass” was presented on the screen as feedback.
A previous study showed that the color of the feedback did not
affect the EEG data (Martín et al., 2010). To obtain enough trials
for averaging in each condition, we set the total number of trials to
400, divided into 20 blocks. Each block included a 3 s countdown
to remind the participants to prepare themselves.
It was emphasized to participants before the experiment that
each deck had its own rules and had enough cards to ensure that
it would not be exhausted during the trial. The cards in each deck
were presented in a fixed pseudorandom order; the “passed” cards
remained at the top of that deck and would be presented the next
time if the participant chose to play with that deck (participants
were not informed of this procedure). This setting was to ensure
that the expected value of each deck was the same as designed
and the same for each participant. The payoff schedules for each
deck reflected the net outcomes and were changed slightly from
the original IGT2. Two of the decks (C and D) were advantageous
2The outcomes of Deck A included 100, 100, 80, 90, 130, −50, −100, −150,
−200, and −250. The outcomes of deck B included 100, 100, 100, 100, 80, 80,
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental flow of the IGT task.
and produced a net gain over repeated play. The expected val-
ues for 10 consecutive cards of decks C and D were 200 and 250,
respectively3. The other two decks were disadvantageous (A and
B) and caused a net loss over repeated play. The expected values
for 10 consecutive cards of decks A and B were both −250. In
addition, within each type of deck (advantageous and disadvan-
tageous), one deck (B or D) presented an infrequent (10%) but
relatively large loss, whereas the other deck (A or C) presented a
frequent (50%) but relatively small loss.
PROCEDURE
The participants were first introduced to the experiment and
given an opportunity to ask questions. After an informed consent
was signed, the study began. The distance from the partici-
pant’s eyes to the screen was 60 cm; the visual angle was ∼4.7◦.
Participants were told that they would be paid based on their
performance before the formal study began. Participants were
allowed a rest between every 2 blocks. The EEG recording
90, 120, 130, and −1150. The outcomes of Deck C included 50, 50, 40, 60, 70,
−5, −10, −15, −15, and −25. The outcomes of Deck D included 50, 50, 50,
50, 40, 40, 40, 60, 70, and−200. In the original IGT, the magnitude of win was
the same across all trials and only the magnitude of loss varied. Thus, partic-
ipants only needed to be concerned about the loss. This characteristic implies
that the task measures the variance of loss but not the global reinforcement
(Dunn et al., 2006). If a card includes both wins and losses at the same time, it
would be difficult to distinguish the brain activities associated with a win and
loss (Weller et al., 2010). Thus, in the present study, we presented the net score
to participants, and both wins and losses varied.
3We kept these two ideas in mind when designing the payoff schedules: first,
the probability of loss will be 10% for two decks and 50% for the other two
decks; second, the magnitude of win will be 100 for two decks and approx-
imately 50 for the other two decks. Thus, it would be difficult to make the
expected value of Deck C be 250. In our task, the expected value of Deck C
was set to 200.
lasted 50–60min. The whole experiment lasted 1.5–2 h, including
preparation and debriefing.
EEG RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
The EEG data were recorded with a band pass of 0.05–100Hz
and a sampling rate of 500Hz from 64 scalp sites using Ag/AgCl
electrodes (NeuroScan Inc., Herndon, Virginia, USA). The left
mastoid was used as a reference in recording and was transformed
to the average of the left and right mastoids reference offline.
Horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) recording electrodes were
positioned at the outer canthi of the left and right eyes; vertical
EOG recording electrodes were positioned above and below the
left eye. The impedances of all electrodes were kept below 5 k
through the experiment.
After the eye movement reduction (ocular reduction in the
NeuroScan software 4.3 version), a 30Hz zero-phase-shift low-
pass filter, 24 dB/oct, was used for the offline digital filter with the
EEG data. Trials with artifacts larger than ±100μV were rejected.
EEG data were analyzed based on the processing stages of
decision making:
Choice evaluation stage: the epoch was set to 200ms prior to
the stimulus onset and 1000ms after the stimulus onset, with the
baseline from 200ms prior to stimulus onset to stimulus onset.
The main modulation we analyzed was P3 (300–500ms). We
conducted three analyses on P3 to examine whether the disadvan-
tageous and advantageous decks would evoke different patterns
of P3 in the left and the right hemisphere at this stage: (1) The
global difference in P3 between the advantageous and disadvan-
tageous decks; (2) The change in ERP modulation differences
between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks over the
course of the task; (3) ERP modulations in the choice evalua-
tion stage with subsequent different responses (play, pass). Nine
electrodes (F5, FZ, F6, C5, CZ, C6, P5, PZ, P6) were used for
analysis.
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Response selection stage: as in Carlson and Zayas (2009), the
preliminary analysis used the average amplitude during −1000 to
800ms as the baseline; the major fluctuations in ERP amplitudes
occurred before the response (DPN) and were relatively stable
after the response (particularly 200ms before feedback, i.e., 600–
800ms after the response). Thus, in the formal analysis, we used
the 600-800ms after the response as the baseline and the 800ms
preceding the response as the analysis time window for DPN (we
also referred to the average response time of 782ms to set the
time window). We analyzed whether different responses (“play”
or “pass”) would show different DPN. The same nine electrodes
were used for this analysis as in the previous stage.
Feedback evaluation stage: we focused our analyses on the
effects of the valence and the magnitude of feedback on the FRN
and P3. According to the valence and the magnitude of the out-
come, the feedback was divided into four categories: large loss
(losses of 100 or more; appeared in decks A, B, and D), small loss
(losses of less than 100; appeared in decks A, and C), large win
(wins of 90 or more; appeared in decks A and B), small win (wins
of less than 90; appeared in decks C and D). Based on our results
and previous studies, the mean amplitude during 300–450ms
was selected to capture P3. Consistent with previous studies, the
amplitude of the FRN was affected by P2; as in Toyomaki and
Murohashi (2005), we adopted the difference between the positive
peak of 150–200ms and the negative peak of 220–330ms as the
amplitude of the FRN. From our results and consistent with pre-
vious studies (Li et al., 2010; Rigoni et al., 2010), the prominent
difference lies in the midline electrodes. Thus, we analyzed the
FZ, FCZ, and CZ for FRN, and the CZ, CPZ, and PZ for P3. The
analysis on amplitude was performed using SPSS 18.0; all analyses
used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
For behavioral results, we conducted two main analyses: first, the
net score (the number of plays with advantageous decks minus
the number of plays with disadvantageous decks) over the course
of the task; second, the profile of the response for each deck of
cards.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Net score in each block
To explore the trend of net score over the course of the task, a
repeated ANOVA revealed that the Block effect was significant,
F(19, 475) = 5.89, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.191 (see Figure 2A). From
the figure, we can see that over the course of time, the propor-
tion of “play” responses with the advantageous deck increased.
Further analysis showed that the block net score was significantly
larger than 0 from block 6 to 20 (t-value ranged from 2.9 to 5.6;
to adjust for multiple comparisons, we set p < 0.01).
Number of plays in the IGT
The number of plays in each deck is presented in Figure 2B. The
proportion of play for each deck was 89.4% (D), 86.5% (C),
77.1% (A), and 65.2% (B). A 4 (Deck) × 20 (Block) repeated
ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect of
Deck, F(3, 75) = 18.38, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.424. Post-hoc analysis
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral performance in the IGT. (A) Net score in each
block. (B) The number of plays in each block for each deck.
revealed that the number of plays in decks D and C were sig-
nificantly larger than decks A and B, and deck A was more
often chosen to play than deck B. There was also a significant
main effect of Block, F(19, 475) = 3.64, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.127.
The Deck × Block interaction was significant, F(57, 1425) = 3.68,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.128. From Figure 2B, we saw different trends
for each deck: the number of plays with deck D remained high
throughout the task, while the number of plays for deck C showed
a trend toward an increase over the course. For deck A, the num-
ber of plays showed a trend toward a decrease, while deck B had
the most significant trend of decreasing the number of plays.
These results indicated that participants showed a learning effect
in the task.
ERP RESULTS
Choice evaluation stage
(1) The global difference in the ERP modulations between
advantageous and disadvantageous decks
The grand averageof advantageous and disadvantageous decks in
the choice evaluation stage was presented in Figure 3A.
We analyzed the mean amplitude of P3 on 9 electrodes
(F5, FZ, F6, C5, CZ, C6, P5, PZ, P6). A 2 (Type of deck:
advantageous, disadvantageous) × 3 (Region: frontal, central,
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FIGURE 3 | ERP results in the choice evaluation stage. (A)
Global difference between advantageous and disadvantageous
decks. (B) Amplitudes of disadvantageous decks and advantageous
decks in different regions. (C) Topographical maps for the
difference wave between disadvantageous decks and advantageous
decks in different periods of the task. (D) Comparison of
modulations between different responses. Error bars indicate the
standard error.
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parietal) × 3 (Laterality: left, middle, right) repeated ANOVA
was conducted. Only the results of the main effect of Type
of deck and the interactions involving Type of deck were pre-
sented here. The mean numbers of artifact-free trials for analysis
were 197 and 196 for disadvantageous and advantageous decks,
respectively.
There was a significant interaction between Type of deck and
Region, F(2, 50) = 8.29, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.249; Type of deck and
Laterality, F(2, 50) = 7.20, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.224; the three-way
interaction of Type of deck × Region × Laterality was also
significant, F(4, 100) = 5.79, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.188. Further anal-
ysis of the three way interaction revealed that the interaction
between Type of deck and Laterality showed significant differ-
ences in different regions, i.e., the interaction was significant
in the frontal (p = 0.007) and central (p = 0.009) regions and
marginally significant in the parietal region (p = 0.060). The
significant interactions revealed a larger P3 for advantageous
decks in the left hemisphere and a larger P3 for disadvantageous
decks in the right hemisphere (see Figure 3B). The results also
showed that the P3 amplitude difference between advantageous
and disadvantageous decks in the left hemisphere decreased from
the frontal to the parietal region, with a significant difference
in the frontal (p = 0.005) and central (p = 0.027) regions but
not in the parietal region (p = 0.580). In the right hemisphere,
the differences between the advantageous and disadvantageous
decks were significant in the central (p = 0.027) and the pari-
etal regions (p = 0.029) and marginally significant in the frontal
region (p = 0.095). The interaction between Type of deck and
Laterality was consistent with the emotional asymmetry hypoth-
esis that positive emotion evoked more activity in the left brain,
and negative emotion evoked more activity in the right brain
(Cunningham et al., 2005; Dunn et al., 2006; Ohgami et al.,
2006).
(2) Change of ERP differences between the advantageous and
disadvantageous decks in different periods of the task
To explore whether the ERPmodulations changed over the course
of the task, we divided the task into five periods; each period con-
sisted of four blocks (80 trials). See Figure 3C for topographical
maps of periods 1, 3, and 5.
A 5 (Period of task: period 1, period 2, period 3, period 4,
period 5) × 3 (Region: frontal, central, parietal) × 3 (Laterality:
left, middle, right) repeated ANOVA was conducted on the dif-
ference amplitude of P3 (the advantageous decks subtracted
from the disadvantageous decks). The results showed that the
main effect of Period of task (p = 0.142) and the interactions
involving this variable (p ranged from 0.323 to 0.751) were
non-significant. However, as shown in Figure 3C, the difference
amplitude decreased in the left hemisphere and increased in the
right hemisphere over the course of the task.
(3) ERP modulations in the choice evaluation stage with differ-
ent subsequent responses
The best choice for the disadvantageous decks A and B was to
“pass.” However, the behavioral responses indicated there were a
number of “play” responses. For the advantageous decks C and D,
there were few “pass” responses. Thus, there were three types of
choices: advantageous decks play, disadvantageous decks play, and
disadvantageous decks pass. The minimum number of artifact-
free trials was in the disadvantageous pass condition (56 trials).
We analyzed the modulations by categorizing the trials according
to the subsequent types of choice (see Figure 3D). From the fig-
ure, we can see that the disadvantageous decks with the response
“pass” showed greater P3 amplitude than “play,” particularly in
the right hemisphere and the midline.
A 3 (Type of choice: advantageous decks play, disadvantageous
decks play, disadvantageous decks pass) × 3 (Region: frontal,
central, parietal) × 3 (Laterality: left, middle, right) repeated
ANOVA was conducted on P3 amplitude. The results showed
that there was a marginally significant main effect of Type of
choice, F(2, 50) = 3.06, p = 0.071, η2p = 0.109. There was a signif-
icant interaction between Type of choice and Region, F(4, 100) =
4.19, p = 0.021, η2p = 0.144; and Type of choice and Laterality,
F(4, 100) = 4.17, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.143; the three-way interac-
tion was also significant, F(8, 200) = 3.44, p = 0.010, η2p = 0.121.
Simple effect analysis revealed that the main effect of Type
of choice was not significant in the left hemisphere, F(2, 50) =
1.15, p = 0.266, η2p = 0.058, but was significant in the midline
[F(2, 50) = 3.60, p = 0.049, η2p = 0.126] and the right hemisphere
[F(2, 50) = 6.55, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.208]. The disadvantageous
decks pass condition had the largest P3 amplitude. At the same
time, the interaction between Type of choice and Region showed
different patterns across hemispheres; the interaction was signifi-
cant in the left hemisphere (p = 0.004), marginally significant in
the midline (p = 0.059), and not significant in the right hemi-
sphere (p = 0.144). Further analysis showed that the interaction
in the left hemisphere indicated that the effect of Type of choice
was significant in the parietal region but not in the frontal or
central regions; the interaction in the midline indicated that the
effect of Type of choice was significant in the central and pari-
etal regions but not in the frontal region. These effects of Type of
choice all showed the disadvantageous decks pass condition had
larger P3 amplitude than the other two conditions. To summa-
rize, the three-way interaction showed that Type of choice had
an effect in specific regions and hemisphere, i.e., in the midline
and the right hemisphere; the disadvantageous deck pass showed
a larger P3 amplitude.
Response selection stage. See Figure 4A for the grand aver-
age. From the figure, we can see that the response “pass”
(press “→”) showed larger negativity, whereas the response
“play” (press “←”) showed smaller negativity.
A 2 (Type of choice: play, pass) × 3 (Region: frontal, central,
parietal)× 3 (Laterality: left, middle, right) repeated ANOVA was
conducted on the mean amplitude of the DPN. The minimum
mean number of artifact-free trials among these conditions was
78. The results showed that there was a significant main effect
of Type of choice, F(1, 25) = 22.60, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.475. There
was a significant interaction between Type of choice and Region,
F(2, 50) = 4.98, p = 0.022, η2p = 0.166; and a significant interac-
tion between Type of choice and Laterality, F(2, 50) = 4.00, p =
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FIGURE 4 | ERP results in the response selection stage. (A) ERP
modulations with different response types. (B) Decision Preceding
Negativity amplitudes with different responses. (C) ERP modulations
with different response types to disadvantageous and advantageous
decks. (D) Decision Preceding Negativity amplitudes in different periods
over the course of the task. Error bars indicate the standard error.
0.036, η2p = 0.138. The three-way interaction was not significant,
F(4, 100) = 2.24, p = 0.088, η2p = 0.082.
Simple effect analysis revealed that for the Type of choice ×
Region interaction, the effect of Type of choice was significant at
all frontal, central and parietal regions (p < 0.001), with a larger
effect at the central region (see Figure 4B left panel). For the Type
of choice × Laterality interaction, the effect of Type of choice was
also significant in both the left and right hemispheres and the
midline (p < 0.001); the right hemisphere showed a smaller effect
(see Figure 4B right panel). To summarize, the results generally
revealed that the “pass” condition showed larger negativity in
all regions, and the amplitude was largest in the left and middle
regions.
When the type of choice was divided into advantageous decks
and disadvantageous decks (see Figure 4C), we found the pat-
tern was consistent with the previous results; the response “pass”
for disadvantageous decks showed the largest negativity and was
significantly larger than the disadvantageous decks play and the
advantageous decks play (p < 0.05). Furthermore, similar to the
analysis in the choice evaluation stage, we also divided the task
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into five periods; each period consisted of four blocks (80 trials).
A 5 (Period: period 1, period 2, period 3, period 4, period 5) × 3
(Type of choice: disadvantageous deck play, disadvantageous deck
pass, advantageous deck play) × 3 (Region: frontal, central, pari-
etal) × 3 (Laterality: left, midline, right) repeated ANOVA was
conducted. The results showed that the main effect of Period
was significant (F(4, 96) = 3.59, p = 0.024), η2p = 0.130. Further
analysis showed that the negativity in period 1 was smaller than
in periods 2, 4, and 5 (p < 0.05). The Period × Type of choice
interaction was not significant, F(8, 192) = 1.47, p = 0.213, η2p =
0.058. However, there was a trend indicating that the negativity of
the disadvantageous deck pass increased largely from period 1 to
period 2 and remained relatively stable thereafter, while the dis-
advantageous play and the advantageous play did not show such
a trend (see Figure 4D).
Feedback evaluation stage. The grand average of the feedback
evaluation is presented in Figure 5A. The feedback evoked promi-
nent FRN and P3. The FRN was mainly distributed in the frontal
and the central regions, whereas P3 was mainly distributed in
the central and the parietal regions. Analyses were conducted to
examine the effects of the valence and magnitude of the out-
come on the amplitude of these ERP modulations. Main effects
of valence, magnitude or interactions involving these variables are
presented below.
(1) FRN
A 2 (Valence: win, loss) × 2 (Magnitude: large, small) × 3
(Electrode: FZ, FCZ, CZ) repeated ANOVA was conducted on
the FRN amplitude. The minimum mean number of artifact-
free trials among these conditions was 80. The results showed
that, consistent with prior studies, FRN was sensitive to Valence
but not Magnitude. The main effect of Valence was significant,
F(1, 25) = 7.49, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.230; loss evoked a larger FRN
(see Figure 5B). The main effect of Magnitude was not signifi-
cant, F(1, 25) = 0.055, p = 0.816, η2p = 0.002. There was a signif-
icant interaction between Valence and Electrode, F(2, 50) = 8.77,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.260; the interaction indicated that the differ-
ence between a win and loss was largest in the FZ (p = 0.002),
then in the FCZ (p = 0.015), and smallest in the CZ (p = 0.150).
Other interactions were non-significant.
(2) P3
A 2 (Valence: win, loss) × 2 (Magnitude: large, small) × 3
(Electrode: CZ, CPZ, PZ) repeated ANOVA was conducted on
the P3 amplitude. The results showed that there was a significant
main effect of Valence, F(1, 25) = 31.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.555;
loss evoked a larger P3. There was a significant main effect of
Magnitude, F(1, 25) = 14.08, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.360; the larger
magnitude evoked a larger P3. There was a significant interaction
between Valence and Electrode, F(2, 50) = 6.66, p = 0.011, η2p =
0.210, and between Magnitude and Electrode, F(2,50) = 6.65,
p = 0.012, η2p = 0.210. Other interactions were non-significant.
As shown in Figure 5C, the interactions between Valence and
Electrode and between Magnitude and Electrode did not affect
the main effects.
Considering that the global feedback results might be con-
founded by the probability of wins and losses, we conducted
further analyses by comparing the decks with the same probability
of wins and losses. Because decks B and D had few trials of loss
and did not have enough trials for averaging, we compared decks
A and C, which had 50% wins and losses (see Figure 5D). In
Figure 5D, we can see that the ERP modulations showed a simi-
lar pattern as the global results. Further analysis also showed that
the amplitude of P3 was sensitive to both Valence andMagnitude,
while the amplitude of the FRN was only sensitive to Valence.
(3) Correlation analysis between the FRN effect and the P3
amplitude difference between disadvantageous and advanta-
geous decks in the choice evaluation stage
FRN is an ERP modulation specifically related to decision mak-
ing; it reflects the quick evaluation of whether the results were
consistent with the expectation (Wu and Zhou, 2009). Thus,
the amplitude difference between wins and losses reflect an
individual’s ability to discriminate information with different
valences in the environment. The evaluation of choice was based
on learning from experience, i.e., feedback for choice. Thus,
we further analyzed the relationship between the FRN effect
(amplitude difference between loss and win) and the ampli-
tude difference between disadvantageous decks and advanta-
geous decks in the choice evaluation stage. The FRN effect was
largest in FZ, and the P3 amplitude difference between dis-
advantageous decks and advantageous decks was also largest
in the frontal region. Thus, we calculated the relationship
between the FRN effect at FZ and the P3 amplitude dif-
ference between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks
in the choice evaluation stage at electrode F5 (left hemi-
sphere) and F6 (right hemisphere). The results showed that
the FRN effect was negatively correlated with the P3 ampli-
tude difference at F5, r = −0.515, p = 0.007; the FRN effect
was positively correlated with the P3 amplitude difference at
F6, r = 0.459, p = 0.018. These results indicated that the larger
the FRN effect, the better the individual discriminated disad-
vantageous and advantageous decks in the choice evaluation
stage.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we successfully adopted a revised version
of the IGT and used the ERP technique to examine the neu-
ral correlates of different stages of uncertain decision making.
The main results were as follows: first, in the choice evaluation
stage, the advantageous decks and disadvantageous decks were
associated with positive and negative somatic representations
and showed differential modulations in the brain. Specifically,
the advantageous decks evoked a larger P3 in the left frontal
hemisphere than the disadvantageous decks, and the disadvan-
tageous decks evoked a marginally significant larger P3 in the
right frontal hemisphere than the advantageous decks, consis-
tent with our predictions. These effects extended to the central
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FIGURE 5 | ERP results in the feedback evaluation stage. (A)
Grand average ERP for different valences and magnitudes in
feedback. (B) The effects of valence and magnitude on FRN
amplitude. (C) The effects of valence and magnitude on P3
amplitude. (D) Grand average ERP of decks A and C. Error bars
indicate the standard error.
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regions. Second, in the response selection stage, there was a disso-
ciation for the pre-response ERP modulation (DPN) between the
responses of “play” and “pass.” The responses of “pass” evoked
a larger DPN than “play,” and this effect was mainly caused by
the disadvantageous decks. This observation may reflect the fact
that the somatic states guided participants to make the response
“pass” and is consistent with our predictions. However, the effects
extended to the whole brain. Third, in the feedback evaluation
stage, FRN was only sensitive to the valence of the outcome,
whereas P3 was sensitive to both the valence and the magnitude
of the outcome, consistent with our predictions and previous
studies.
CHOICE EVALUATION STAGE
One of the strengths of this study was that we studied the
choice evaluation stage of uncertain decision making. Bechara
et al. (1996) suggested that the advantageous and disadvanta-
geous decks represented emotional information, such as good
or bad, by somatic signaling. However, the temporal resolu-
tion of SCRs is low; thus, the nature of the anticipatory SCR
is not clear. The two ERP studies (Carlson and Zayas, 2009;
Bianchin and Angrilli, 2011) did not clearly examine the choice
evaluation stage because they used an IGT version with free
choice. In the present study, we adopted a single choice version
of the IGT that allowed us to examine the choice evaluation
stage.
Results showed that the advantageous decks evoked a greater
P3 in the left hemisphere (the frontal and central regions),
whereas the disadvantageous decks evoked a greater P3 in the
right hemisphere (the central and parietal regions, marginally
greater in the frontal region). These results indicated that the
advantageous decks were associated with positive somatic rep-
resentations and the disadvantageous decks were associated with
negative somatic representations in the brain. These findings were
consistent with the notion of emotive functions with asymmet-
ric cortical activity (Cunningham et al., 2005; Ohgami et al.,
2006). Cunningham et al. (2005) asked the participants to make
good vs. bad (evaluative) judgments on socially relevant con-
cepts and recorded their late positive potential (LPP) at the same
time. The results revealed that the amplitude of the LPP was
higher in the left frontal hemisphere when the concepts were
rated good and higher in the right frontal hemisphere when
the concepts were rated bad. Ohgami et al. (2006) also found
that the left hemisphere showed greater activation with mon-
etary rewards. Kayser et al. (1997) found that negative stimuli
evoked greater N2 and P3 in the right hemisphere. Graham
and Cabeza (2001) found larger frontal modulations when view-
ing happy faces. The asymmetry effects extended to the central
region and partly to the parietal region; this result might be
caused by the difference in the nature of the stimuli and the
paradigms. Further studies are needed to explore this issue.
For example, the cited studies all used explicit emotional stim-
uli, such as facial expressions, words, and emotional pictures.
However, the stimuli in our study consisted of cards without
any inherent emotional information; only upon playing with
these cards were they associated with positive or negative somatic
representations.
Regarding the ERP modulations over the course of the task,
the P3 amplitude was not significantly different among the
five periods, although we could see the trend of the ampli-
tude (the difference wave between the disadvantageous decks
and the advantageous decks) decreasing in the left hemisphere
and increasing in the right hemisphere. Although this result
was unexpected, it was not unreasonable because it has been
found that the rating of “goodness” and “badness” of the decks
was above the chance level as early as after the first 20 trials
(Bowman et al., 2005; Dunn et al., 2006). In the first period
of the present study, participants might have had some sense
of the long-term outcomes of the decks and might have associ-
ated the decks with somatic representations; thus, participants did
not show significant differences for ERP amplitudes in these five
periods.
We also analyzed the ERP waveform difference based on
the participants’ subsequent decisions. The results indicated
that for the disadvantageous decks, different decisions had
already manifested in the choice evaluation stage. The dif-
ferences were mainly at the midline and in the right hemi-
sphere; those cards with a subsequent decision of “pass”
evoked a larger P3 than those with a decision of “play.” This
observation also indicated that the negative somatic repre-
sentations evoked in the choice evaluation stage would affect
the following decisions; the stronger the negative somatic
representations, the more likely the participants decided to
“pass.”
RESPONSE SELECTION STAGE
Prior SCR studies showed that the participants presented
increased anticipatory SCRs before they made disadvantageous
choices; this finding provided important evidence for the theory
that emotional signals guided decision making (Bechara et al.,
1997). However, it was controversial whether the anticipatory
SCRs reflected the anticipation before response selection or before
feedback due to the low temporal resolution of this approach. The
present study used a technique with high temporal resolution,
ERP, and explored the anticipatory effects before the response.
The results showed that the response of “pass” evoked a greater
DPN than the response of “play.” The global results and the results
of the disadvantageous decks all showed the same pattern, and
this pattern presented over the whole brain. This modulation
reflected the anticipation effect of decision making. Contrary to
our hypothesis, the DPN effect was not limited to the right frontal
region but spread over the whole brain. It may be that the antic-
ipatory effect was strong and extended to the central and the
parietal areas, however, further studies are needed to explore this
issue.
The anticipation effect in the present study was somewhat dif-
ferent from the previous SCR studies (Bechara et al., 1996, 1997)
and two prior ERP studies (Carlson and Zayas, 2009; Bianchin
and Angrilli, 2011); these studies used the free choice version
of the IGT. Their results showed that the anticipatory SCR or
ERP was greater before participants selected the disadvantageous
decks, however, the confounding effect of attention shifting and
searching could not be excluded in those studies (Dunn et al.,
2006). The results in the present study indicated that the greater
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DPN was associated with the response “pass”; this finding may
indicate that when the designated card evoked a stronger phys-
iological response, the participants felt uneasy and tended to
respond “pass.” The results also showed that when participants
responded “play,” the advantageous decks and the disadvanta-
geous decks evoked similar DPNs, indicating that if a card did
not evoke a significant physiological response, the participants
tended to play with the card. This outcome is consistent with the
suggestion that frontal cortex activation was associated with iden-
tifying negative outcomes and mediates behavioral shifting from
disadvantageous choices (Asp et al., 2013). It should be noted
that not all disadvantageous decks evoked a larger DPN; this sit-
uation may occur because the disadvantageous decks also had
some winning cards, although they were disadvantageous decks
in the long run. Thus, if the participants perceived the current
trial to be safe and did not evoke a physiological response, they
would “play”; in contrast, if they perceived the current trial to
be risky and evoked a physiological response, they would “pass.”
Along the course of the task, they were more aware of the risky
decks and selected to “pass” the cards from disadvantageous
decks. These results were also consistent with the literature that
emotional stimuli modulate readiness for action in a dynamic
way; readiness potential was strongly augmented in the emo-
tional condition (Grecucci et al., 2009; van Loon et al., 2010).
The results, therefore, support the somatic marker hypothesis
(Damasio, 1994) and indicate that there was an anticipatory
process that occurred before the response. The present results
provided a cortical index of somatic representations on decision
making. However, the difference between the SCR and the DPN
should be noted. The SCRs were larger for the “play” to disadvan-
tageous decks because selecting from the disadvantageous decks
was recognized as a risky choice, in general, after the initial learn-
ing phase. The participants could only record the “play” to the
disadvantageous decks, whereas merely attending to the disad-
vantageous decks (finally “play” to the advantageous decks) could
not be recorded. For the present DPN results, the DPN was larger
for “pass” in the disadvantageous decks after the initial learning
phase (from period 2). This effect may occur because if the par-
ticipants perceived risk from this trial and showed a larger DPN,
they would choose to “pass” this card. Thus, the SCR and DPN
have some differences, however, they are both indicators of antic-
ipation and have relationships with the subsequent behavioral
responses.
FEEDBACK PROCESSING STAGE
For the feedback evaluation stage, the results of FRN and
P3 were consistent with the literature. The P3 was sensi-
tive to both the valence and the magnitude of the outcome
(Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; Wu and Zhou, 2009). Loss
and larger magnitude evoked a greater P3; this outcome was
also consistent with Carlson and Zayas (2009), who stud-
ied children’s decision making with a children’s version of
the IGT.
The present results indicated that the FRN was only sensitive
to valence, which is consistent with previous studies (Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Toyomaki
and Murohashi, 2005; Hajcak et al., 2006). This observation
indicated that the FRN reflected the early appraisal of good-
ness of the results (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). The results that
the FRN amplitude in FZ was negatively correlated with the
choice evaluation stage P3 amplitude difference in F5 and pos-
itively correlated with that in F6 suggested that the evalua-
tion of choice was related to decision experience from feed-
back processing. Thus, it was a learning process. One study
found that the brain’s response to feedback (the FRN) pre-
dicted whether subjects learned to avoid an erroneous response
the next time, suggesting that FRN amplitudes may reflect
motor learning (van der Helden et al., 2010). Our study
showed that FRN may also reflect a decision-making learning
process.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are several limitations of the study. First, we did not record
SCRs at the same time. One study recorded magnetoencephalo-
gram (MEG) and SCRs at the same time while participants were
presented with emotional and neutral pictures; greater activ-
ity was found at 180ms for the emotional pictures than the
neutral ones for the event-related magnetic fields (ERFs) data.
There was also a strong association of the early ERF effects and
the later SCR effect with emotional aroused stimuli (D’Hondt
et al., 2010). If we could record ERP and SCRs at the same
time, the relationship between anticipatory SCRs and antici-
patory ERP effects could be examined more directly. Second,
individual differences may have had some effect on the results
(Carlson and Zayas, 2009). However, due to the small sam-
ple size of the present study, we could not examine this issue.
Future studies should recruit a larger sample size. Third, Damasio
(Damasio, 1994) suggested that both emotion and cognition were
involved in decision making; one of the functions of somatic
markers was to serve as an indicator of the value of response
options and as a boost signal for continued working memory
and attention processing (Damasio, 1996). However, the present
study did not examine the role of cognitive factors in deci-
sion making. Thus, further studies are needed to examine this
question.
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, the neural correlates of different stages of uncertain
decision making were examined in this study. The results indi-
cated that in the choice evaluation stage, the advantageous decks
and the disadvantageous decks were associated with positive and
negative somatic representations in the brain. In the response
selection stage, participants showed an anticipatory effect. Finally,
in the feedback evaluation stage, FRN was only sensitive to the
valence of the outcome, while P3 was sensitive to both the valence
and the magnitude of the outcome.
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